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Abstract
The goal of this article is to extend the ideas concerning asynchronous Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerant (or BFT) consensus algorithm given in the work of
Bracha, Toueg [5] and Baird’s Hashgraph consensus [2]. We propose a fam-
ily of atomic broadcast algorithms, which Hashgraph consensus is closely
related to. We also do preliminary comparative algorithm speed analysis
which shows that some members of the family seriously outperform Hash-
graph consensus. These algorithms can also be readily used as a base of
proof-of-stake consensuses. In appendix we provide an extension of Hash-
graph gossip protocol, which efficiently handles byzantine fault information
exchange between nodes.
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0. Introduction
The problem of Atomic Broadcast is well-known in the theory of dis-
tributed systems. Informally, Atomic Broadcast is a protocol allowing a set
of processes (or nodes) to broadcast messages in such a way that processes
agree on the set of messages they deliver and the order of messages delivered.
Such protocols can be used in cryptocurrency and blockchain domains, which
recently gained much attention. One such example is Hashgraph consensus
algorithm. In the original paper [2] the consensus algorithm stands a bit iso-
lated from a 40+ year theory of distributed algorithms. One of my original
goals was to answer many “why it is done this way and not the other one?”
questions, which arose while reading the paper. My research not just allowed
me to answer most of them but also revealed one BFT consensus protocol
Hashgraph consensus relates to. Namely, I showed that Hashgraph decide-
Fame procedure is closely connected to consensus protocol for the malicious
case proposed by Bracha and Toueg [5] in 1985. It is worth mentioning that
their paper also contains the famous result that more than 2/3 of processes
should be correct in order to reach the consensus with probability 1. My
study also allowed to construct a family of atomic broadcast algorithms gen-
eralizing Hashgraph consensus ideas. Some of these algorithms are possibly
faster than and as safe as Hashgraph consensus. By “possibly faster” I mean
that I did a comparative speed analysis on a big set of message exchange and
process fault scenarios showing their superiority. Mathematical proof is an
open question and the answer will probably depend on the message exchange
probability model chosen.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows:
• In Section 1 we give the network model and all necessary definitions
from distributed algorithm theory and Hashgraph paper.
• Section 2 is devoted to the description of Hashgraph consensus, in par-
ticular its core decideFame procedure and its connection to classic the-
ory of distributed algorithms.
• In Section 3 we provide a description of atomic broadcast family of
algorithms, which we call BVC family. We give some examples and
show the appropriateness of algorithms.
• We define speed using latency metrics and do the corresponding anal-
ysis of Hashgraph consensus and several algorithms from BVC family
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in Section 4.
• In Section 5 we briefly remind practical use cases of atomic broadcast
algorithms discussed in the paper. We also put final remarks, future
work thoughts and acknowledgement there.
• In the Appendix A we propose an optimization for Hashgraph gos-
sip protocol adding the rules for efficient byzantine (malicious) fault
information exchange between nodes.
1. Network Model and Main Definitions
We start this section with the network model part then proceed with the
main definitions.
1.1. Network Model Description and Justification
Throughout this paper we treat the words “process” and “node” as syn-
onyms. We stick to a variant of standard asynchronous network model con-
sisting of n interconnected nodes whose messages can be delayed arbitrarily
long and some of them may even be lost. Part of the nodes can be faulty
(they are also called “malicious” of “byzantine”) and can make a “coordinated
attack” (loosing/delaying messages, sending malformed ones etc.) on the rest
of the nodes (which act according to protocol rules and are called “honest” or
“correct”) in order to interrupt the correct work of the whole system. By “cor-
rect work” be mean providing a fault-tolerant distributed database service
via consistent ordering of messages bearing database updates/transactions.
This is equivalent to atomic broadcast mentioned in the introduction. We
also require that more than 2n/3 nodes are honest and for any number r
there will an honest node with a-round greater than r (below we define what
a-round is and provide the justification for these requirements).
Atomic broadcast is equivalent to consensus protocol with Byzantine
faults (cf. Proposition 7 in [10], for example) which can be defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Consensus). In the consensus protocol every node has an
initial value from a set V and has eventually to irrevocably decide on a value
from V. The following properties should be satisfied:
• Agreement. All honest nodes decide on the same value.
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• Validity. If all honest nodes start with the same value v, then all honest
nodes decide on v.
• Termination. All honest nodes eventually decide.
Famous FLP theorem [6] implies that consensus protocol is impossible even
with one faulty node. This motivated Bracha and Toueg [5] to work with
consensus where the expected termination time is finite. In [4] Bracha also
defined this property using the notion of asynchronous rounds :
Definition 2 (Bracha). In a distributed system with maximum f faulty
processes:
• We define inductively asynchronous rounds (or simply a-rounds)
as follows: in each a-round, every node sends messages to all others,
waits for only n− f messages of that a-round, and proceeds to the next
a-round.
• We say that consensus protocol has a probabilistic termination prop-
erty if the probability that an honest node is undecided after r a-rounds
approaches zero as r approaches infinity.
Remark 1. Bracha and Toueg originally used the word “round”, which we
intentionally replaced by “a-round” in order to not confuse them with Hash-
graph’s rounds introduced later.
Consensus protocol is possible with probabilistic termination. An already
mentioned Bracha and Toueg result in [5] states that the necessary condition
for this is that the maximal possible number f of faulty processes is less
than n/3. In the same paper they have also proven that this was a sufficient
condition assuming the so-called fair scheduler property of the network and
giving an example of consensus protocol, which we will describe in the next
section. Bracha continued their work in [4] removing that additional assump-
tion using a coin toss trick. As we see, the above results naturally justify all
the properties of our network model.
1.2. Main Definitions
In this subsection we briefly remind main definitions from Baird’s Hash-
graph consensus article [2] adding comments and links to classic notions.
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• Gossip protocol means that any node p chooses another node q at ran-
dom and then p sends (or “gossips”) q all of the information it knows
so far. After that (or at the same time) p repeats this procedure with
a different node and so on. Node q and all the other nodes repeatedly
do the same.
• Hashgraph is the directed graph that represents the gossip history: who
gossiped to whom, and in what order. Figure 1 contains an example of
Hashgraph.
• Vertices in Hashgraph are called events and stored in memory as a se-
quence of bytes, signed by its creator. Nodes should obey the following
rule: If node p gossiped to node q then the latter must create an event
e, which is signed by q and contains the hashes of two other events: q’s
last event and p’s last event prior to that gossip.
• Each of the last two events mentioned in the previous definition is called
parent of the newly created event e. To distinguish them we will also
call q’s last event self-parent of e. As one can see the events of nodes
that obey the above rule form a sequence.
• On creation node also puts it’s local time into event as event’s times-
tamp.
Remark 2. It is worth pointing out that the notions presented above are not
new. Term “event” is present in numerous works starting, probably, with
the influential paper of Lamport [7]. Hashgraph, in its turn, is an analogue
of “space-time diagram” (cf. Lamport [7]) or “communication pattern” (cf.
Lynch [8]), both of which represent node message exchange history.
Noting that “parent” relation is represented by arrows (directed edges) in
hashgraph we continue with definitions:
• Informally, event e follows event e′ if e′ is a parent of an event, which
is a parent of an event, which is .. and so on until e. We allow an event
to follow itself and say that event e′ is an ancestor of an event e if e
follows e′. On hashgraph this means that there is a downward path
from e to e′. Mathematically, “follows” relation is the transitive closure
of the inverse to the “parent” one (similar definitions can be found, for
example, in [7] and [11]).
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Figure 1: Hashgraph for 5 nodes. Vertices are events, edges - “parent” relation.
• As it was mentioned in the above definition of event, honest node should
create events one by one and always put the hash of its previous event
in the next one. This implies that if we take any two events created
by the same honest node then one of them is an ancestor of the other.
Faulty node can violate this rule and on creation put a hash of an event
different from the previous one. This produces pairs of events created
by the same node neither of which is an ancestor of the other one. We
call any such pair (e, e′) a fork and say that e′ is a fork of event e.
• Key notions in Hashgraph consensus are “seeing” and “strongly seeing”.
Event e sees event e′ is e follows e′ and follows no fork by the creator
of e′. An event e strongly sees an event e′ if e sees e′ and e sees more
than 2n/3 events created by different nodes, each of which sees e′.
• Such core notion as Virtual voting can be informally described the
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following way: every node has its version of the hashgraph, so node
p can calculate, using hashgraph’s graph structure, what vote node q
would have sent to it if they had been running a traditional consensus
protocol with Byzantine faults that involved sending votes. Since the
hashgraph alone is sufficient no votes need to be sent, and one can say
that nodes vote virtually. We’ll elaborate on Virtual voting in the next
section.
• Using the above definitions Baird inductively gives the notion of round
R witness (or R-witness for short): All starting events for each node
are round 1 witnesses. An event is R + 1-witness for the given node
if it is node’s earliest event (in the sense of “follows” relation) which
strongly sees more than 2n/3 of R-witnesses.
• Event rounds are naturally derived from witnesses: an event has round
R if it follows an R-witness and doesn’t follow any R + 1-witness.
2. Hashgraph Consensus and Classic Theory
This section is devoted to the connection of Hashgraph consensus and
classic distributed algorithm theory. Hashgraph algorithm [2] can be pre-
sented via mathematical pseudocode as follows:
Procedure: Hashgraph consensus algorithm
run two loops in parallel:
while TRUE do
gossip all known events to a random node
while TRUE do
receive a gossip
create a new event
call divideRounds
call decideFame
call findOrder
As one can see, algorithm de-facto consists of three procedures. First,
divideRounds procedure is just event round and witness calculation and can
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be strictly described as:
Procedure: divideRounds
for each new event x do
r ← max round of parents of x (or 1 if none exist)
if x can strongly see more than 2n/3 round r witnesses then
x.round← r + 1
else
x.round← r
x.witness← (x has no self-parent) or (x.round > round of x’s
self-parent)
Third, findOrder procedure is also quite simple and bears the rules for
adding events to event total order. We’ll briefly discuss it at the end of this
section. Most interesting is the second, decideFame procedure. We’ll show
that under gossip protocol it’s main part is similar to the f-resilient consensus
protocol for the malicious case presented in Bracha and Toueg [5]. For this
we will need an important definition we intentionally kept until now:
Definition 3 (Baird. Famous witness. Informally). A witness is defined
to be famous if the hashgraph structure shows that most nodes received it
fairly soon after it was created.
Words “fairly soon” will become clear after we present decideFame as a math-
ematical pseudocode. Note that we present the core of this procedure, re-
moving rather artificial “coin flip” part of it (cf. [2] for the whole version).
The sole goal of coin tosses, flips, etc., is to guarantee that consensus will
be reached with probability one even in the “worst” and unlikely scenarios.
As it was mentioned during the network description, such tricks are rather
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standard (cf. for example Protocol 2 in [4]) in distributed algorithm theory.
Procedure: decideFame (no coin flip)
Y ← set of newly added/created witnesses on the gossip receipt,
ordered by “follows” relation, earliest going first
for y in Y do
y.famous← Undecided // initializing witness fame
X ← set of all witnesses with undecided fame and of round lesser
than y.round
for x in X do
d← y.round− x.round // d > 0
if d = 1 then
y.votex ← can y see x ? // votex: vote x is famous or not
else // d ≥ 2
S ← set of all round (y.round− 1) witnesses that y can
strongly see
v ← majority vote in S for whether x is famous or not (is
TRUE for a tie)
t← number of events in S with a votex equal to v
y.votex ← v // voting
if t > 2n/3 then
x.famous← v // deciding
As Baird fairly notes, this procedure consists of parallel BFT binary con-
sensuses on whether a witness is famous or not. This is done via virtual
voting in the sense that no special voting messages are being sent and just
the hashgraph structure is being used. As promised, we explain in detail this
statement and show that BFT binary consensuses above are similar to the
one in Bracha and Toueg [5].
Fame decision for the given R-witness is converted to the binary con-
sensus as follows: each node that created an (R + 1)-witness participates in
consensus with initial value 0 if the latter witness sees that round R witness,
or 1 if it doesn’t. Note that divideRounds procedure does not guarantee
that every active node will have round R + 1 witness (by “active” we mean
that node creates arbitrarily large round witnesses as time goes on). Indeed,
sometimes an active node can pass directly from R-witness to (R+2)-witness.
At the same time classic consensus problem requires every node to start with
some value. In order to overcome this technical issue we’ll show the sim-
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ilarity of decideFame consensus and Bracha-Toueg consensus under “round
completion” procedure:
Definition 4. By round completion we mean the following addition to
round definition: when a node creates (R +K)-witness (K > 1) right after
R-witness then we consider that (R + K)-witness to be also round (R +
1), . . . , (R +K − 1) witness.
This addition clearly guarantees that every active node will have an (R+1)-
witness.
Bracha and Toueg f -resilient consensus protocol for the malicious case in
[5] is given as algorithm 1 pseudocode.
Informally, this consensus can be described as follows: In order to decide
which value to choose, processes repeatedly broadcast their current phase
number and a binary value. They use phases to overcome misleading mes-
sages from the malicious processes, and accept a value from a process if
enough other processes confirmed (echoed) that a given value was indeed
broadcasted by this process. After receiving enough values, process chooses
the new one by majority principle and passes to the next phase. A process
decides i if it accepts more than (n + f)/2 messages with value i (here f is
a maximal possible number of malicious processes).
In order to prove the main result of this section we’ll need the following
definition:
Definition 5. We define relaxed strongly seeing the same way “strongly
seeing” is defined except that we replace “more than 2n/3” by “more than
(n+ f)/2” (f = b(n− 1)/3c) events created by different nodes.
Remark 3. “Relaxed strongly seeing” and “strongly seeing” definitions are
the same when n is not divisible by 3. “Strongly seeing” is stricter when 3
divides n.
Now we are ready to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1. With relaxed strongly seeing and round completion proce-
dure BFT binary consensuses in decideFame procedure follow from enriched
Bracha-Toueg f -resilient consensus protocol for the malicious case with f =
b(n− 1)/3c.
Proof. The proof is quite straightforward and starts with the following in-
terpretations:
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Algorithm 1: Node p : f-consensus. Value is either 0 or 1 (ini-
tialized with p’s starting value). Phaseno: integer (analogue of
rounds). Message_count: tuple, representing given value message
counts. Echo_count: n×2 array representing echoes of messages broad-
casted by nodes. Message consists of type: (’initial’, ’echo’), from (node
id), value, phaseno.
while TRUE do
message_count← 0; phaseno← 0; echo_count← 0
forall 1 ≤ q ≤ n do
send(q, (initial, p, value, phaseno))
while message_count(0) + message_count(1) < n− f do
receive(msg)
if it is the first message received from the sender with these
values of msg.type, msg.from and msg.phaseno then
if msg.type = initial then
forall 1 ≤ q ≤ n do
send(q, (echo, msg.from, msg.value, msg.phaseno))
else if msg.type = echo and msg.phaseno = phaseno then
echo_count(msg.from, msg.value) += 1
if echo_count(msg.from,msg.value) = b(n+ f)/2c+ 1
then
message_count(msg.value) += 1
else if msg.type = echo and msg.phaseno > phaseno then
send(p, msg)
if message_count(1) > message_count(0) then
value ← 1
else
value ← 0
if there is i such that message_count(i) > (n+ f)/2 then
dp ← i // deciding
phaseno += 1
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• [Fame as consensus] As already mentioned, fame decision for the given
R-witness w can be considered as consensus problem where each active
node starts with initial value 0 if its (R + 1)-witness sees w and 1 if it
doesn’t.
• [Virtual voting] The fact that node p’s (R+K+1)-witness sees node q’s
event that, in its turn, sees node r’s (R +K)-witness wr (K ≥ 1) can
be interpreted as situation when r has sent (initial, r, wr.vote, K − 1)
message to q and the latter echoed this message as (echo, r, wr.vote,
K − 1) to node p. See an example on figure 2.
• [Gossip protocol] Taking into account the above interpretation, we
treat gossip receipt by a process in Hashgraph consensus as a batch
of receive(msg) virtual voting interpretations in Bracha-Toueg proto-
col, and this batch should be processed without exiting the inner while
loop in algorithm 1.
• [Phase-to-round correspondence] Finally, despite having very similar
inductive definitions phases and rounds are not in general the same:
phases are based on binary value count, whereas rounds on witness
hash counts. In order to completely equalize them message content
in Bracha-Toueg protocol should be enriched as follows: whenever a
process passes to the next phase it generates a number, which is broad-
casted and echoed alongside with value. If echo_count takes into ac-
count tuples (number, value) instead of just value then phases become
equal to rounds when number generated by a process is just the latest
witness hash. Indeed, one can easily verify that in this case:
– the fact that the latest node p event starts to strongly see (in
relaxed way) node q witness of the previous round is equivalent to
echo_count(q, (number, value)) ≥ b(n+ f)/2c+ 1
for f = b(n− 1)/3c.
– the fact that newly created node p event is the next round witness
is equivalent to
message_count(0) +message_count(1) ≥ n− f.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Virtual voting example. On both figures w is a witness and w′ is next round
witness. The fact that w′ sees nodes p1 and p2 events that see w on figure (2a) can be
interpreted as a set of init, echo messages on figure (2b).
In order to finish the proof we need to show that decision procedures
in decideFame and Bracha-Toueg f -resilient consensuses lead to the same
results. Recall that decideFame consensuses require that more than 2n/3
witnesses strongly seen by next round witness have the same vote v, while
Bracha-Toueg consensus requires (under interpretation) that more than (n+
f)/2 witnesses, which are strongly seen by newly created next round process
p witness, have v as a vote. It is not hard to see that both these conditions
imply that all next round witnesses will vote v. Thus the decisions are
equivalent and the proof is finished. 
We presenting the last, findOrder procedure not only for completeness
reasons. In the next chapter we will present several speed enhancements for
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this procedure. We start with the following definitions from [2]:
Definition 6. • Once all the witnesses in round r have their fame de-
cided, find the set of famous witnesses in that round, then remove from
that set any famous witness that has the same creator as any other in
that set. The remaining famous witnesses are called unique famous
witnesses.
• The round received number (or round received) of an event x is
defined to be the first round where all unique famous witnesses follow
x.
• We call an event self-ancestor of event e if e follows this event and
they have the same creator.
The findOrder procedure is presented in [2] as the following preudocode:
Procedure: findOrder
forall events x with undefined x.roundReceived do
if there is a round r such that there is no witness y in or before
round r that has y.famous = Undecided
and x is an ancestor of every round r unique famous witness
and this is not true of any round earlier than r then
x.roundReceived← r
s← set of each event z such that z is a self-ancestor of a round
r unique famous witness, and x is an ancestor of z but not of
the self-parent of z
x.consensusT imestamp← median of the timestamps of all the
events in s
return all events with defined roundReceived, sorted by
roundReceived, then ties sorted by consensusT imestamp, then by
whitened signature
As one can see, once a next round unique famous witnesses are defined
there’s a possibility that one or several events got their consensusT imestamp,
are considered to be committed and added to event total order. Baird proves
that this order is invariant among nodes, thus proving that Hashgraph con-
sensus is atomic broadcast algorithm. Having described Hashgraph consensus
we can pass to the next section concerning its possible generalizations and
enhancements.
15
3. BVC Atomic Broadcast Family
Recall from the introduction that atomic broadcast algorithms provide a
way for nodes to consistently order messages or events they create and send
to each other. As usual in literature, order consistency means that if any
honest node determines that e is the i’th event of the total order, then no
honest node determines that e′ is the i’th event, where e′ 6= e (cf. [11] for
example). Leemon Baird notes in [2] that to eventually order all events it is
enough to accomplish two tasks:
• consistently define the event subset consisting of famous witnesses, us-
ing fame voting
• derive the total order for all events afterwards, using procedure find-
Order
In this section we present a family of atomic broadcast algorithms, elabo-
rating on generalizations and improvements for both of these tasks. We will
call this family BVC Family since it will be built on three notions: Base,
Voting and Consensus layers.
3.1. Event Subset Choice Task
One of the first questions, which arise looking at how Hashgraph consen-
sus solves the first task, is “Why should we start with witnesses as candidates
for being famous?”. Witnesses of different rounds form a sequence of layers
starting with the layer of first round witnesses, then second round witnesses
and so on. This simple observation induces a question: “Can we choose an-
other sequence of layers as fame candidates?”. The answer is “yes”. We will
show that there are many possibilities for such layer sequences.
Another question is “Why particular witness fame is decided by the layer
of next (or next-but-one) round witnesses?”. Here, again the answer is “there
are many possibilities to choose this layer”. Natural condition for this layer
is that it should contain sufficiently events in order to conduct fame voting
procedure afterwards (be it BFT consensuses from the previous section or
any other binary consensus algorithm).
Definition 7. Elements of fame candidate layer sequence are called base
layers. Corresponding layers of voting events are called voting layers.
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Appropriate definitions of base and voting layers, combined with fame voting
BFT consensus, allow to construct new family of algorithms. Here word
“appropriate” bears the following meaning:
Definition 8 (Appropriateness). We say that base layers, voting layers
and fame consensus definitions are appropriate if the following conditions
are satisfied:
1. The fact that an event belongs to a particular base or voting layer is
calculated using only event itself and its ancestors. This guarantees that
all honest nodes will have consistent base and voting layers.
2. If an event is known by more than 2f nodes then eventually it will be
an ancestor of some famous event from some base layer (now and fur-
ther f = b(n− 1)/3c is the upper theoretical bound for the faulty nodes
number).
Remark 4 (Atomic broadcast). As we will see in “total order” part of
this section, second appropriateness condition implies that every event known
by more than 2f nodes will be committed (added to the total order) with
probability 1. And this order will be BFT and consistent across the honest
nodes implying the atomic broadcast property.
Now we provide some examples of base and voting layers construction.
We also give a version of fame voting consensus. This will show how rich our
atomic broadcast family is.
3.2. Base Layer Examples
Recall that in network model subsection 1.1 we had Bracha’s asynchronous
rounds definition (cf. a-round definition 2). It gives rise to the follow-
ing “asynchronous” base layer construction (which is called a-base layer, for
short):
Definition 9 (A-base layer). We define inductively a-base layers as fol-
lows:
• Different node starting events form first a-base layer.
• For each node: earliest node’s events that follow at least n− f created
by different nodes events from (k − 1)th a-base layer belong to kth a-
base layer (word “earliest” means that there’s no other events with that
property followed by the given event, except itself).
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Remark 5. A-base layer definition implies that an event can be a member
of several consecutive a-base layers similarly to round completion procedure
(cf. definition 4 in section 2). An example is given on figure (3a).
For completeness and uniformity, we give the following example of base layer,
which is, obviously, used by Hashgraph consensus algorithm:
Definition 10 (S-base layer). We define kth s-base layer (“s” due to “strongly
see” phrase) as the set consisting of all k round witnesses in the sense of
Hashgraph (cf. figure (3b)).
To give next example we need the following important definitions:
Definition 11 (Clear following). We say that an event e clearly follows
and event e′ if e follows e′ and follows no fork of e′.
Remark 6. “Clear following” is weaker than “seeing”: e.g. an event e follows
a fork (e1, e2) that follows event e′. In this case e still clearly follows e′ but
doesn’t see it anymore!
Definition 12 (Strongly following). We say that event e strongly fol-
lows event e′ if e clearly follows e′ and e follows (and not necessarily sees !)
more than (n+ f)/2 events created by different nodes, each of which clearly
follows e′ (again, not necessarily sees).
Replacing “following” by “strongly following” in a-base layer definition, we
get:
Definition 13 (S′-base layer). We define inductively s′-base layers as
follows:
• Different node starting events form first s′-base layer.
• For each node: earliest node’s events that strongly follow at least n− f
created by different nodes events from (k − 1)th s′-base layer belong to
kth s′-base layer.
Remark 7. Honest nodes can have only one event in the given a-base, s-
base or s′-base layers, while malicious nodes, when start forking, can have
several.
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Looking at a-base layer definition one can ask “Why can’t be replace ‘fol-
lowing n − f elements’ by ‘following smaller number of elements’, say 2?”.
The answer is “Yes, we can, but with a small adjustment”. If we require that
next base layer elements follow a small number of previous layer ones, then
some group of malicious nodes can quickly gossip between each other, making
far higher base layers then the rest of the nodes. This group then gossips its
events to other nodes, making sure that these gossiped events will be famous.
In order to counter such de-facto malicious behavior one can demand that at
least from time to time next layer elements should be assigned using n − f
different node events. These reasonings give rise to the following
Definition 14 (C(a, b)-base layer). Let 1 < a ≤ n−f and b > 0 be some
integers. C(a,b)-base layers are defined as follows:
• All node starting events are put into C(a, b)-base layer 1.
• Event belongs to kth C(a, b)-base layer if:
– it is node’s earliest event that follows at least a created by different
nodes events from (k − 1)th C(a, b)-base layer for k not divisible
by b
– it is node’s earliest event that follows at least n− f created by dif-
ferent nodes events from (k−1)th C(a, b)-base layer for k divisible
by b
We see that in the above definition each bth layer requires n − f different
nodes events. This property will also be used later when we will prove “ap-
propriateness” properties.
Definition 15 (C′(a, b)-base layer). If in C(a, b)-base layer definition we
require instead that kth base layer event e is node’s earliest event that follows
at least a different from e and created by different nodes events from (k−1)th
base layer for k not divisible by b, then we get the definition of C′(a,b)-base
layer. Figure (3c) is a particular example.
Remark 8. One can see that C ′(a, b)-base layer definition is also valid for
a = 1. In this case C ′(1, b)-base layers are tightly connected with the com-
pletion of the classic Lamport time notion. Cases C(2, b) and C ′(2, b) also
provide interesting examples of base layers.
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Remark 9. It is clear that all the above base layer definitions are based on
events and their ancestors only, thus satisfying the first property of appropri-
ateness definition 8.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: On all figures we mark events belonging to some base layer with orange color
and by light green the rest events. Event belonging to kth base layer is marked by label
‘k’. We also mark with label ‘x-y’ events simultaneously belonging to xth, (x+ 1)th, . . . ,
up to yth base layers. Figure (3a) represents an example of a-base layer, figure (3b) is
an example of s-base layers (or Hashgraph witnesses), and figure (3c) gives an example of
C ′(1, 4)-base layers. All examples have the same gossip history. Since n = 4, the maximal
number f of malicious processes is 1 and n− f = 3.
We finish base layer examples by generalizing them and giving a generic one:
Definition 16 (G-base layer). We define a generic base layer (or g-
base layer) as follows:
1. Any node starting events are assigned to g-base layer 1.
2. We form higher g-base layers using an inductive rule: kth g-base layer is
built on (k − 1)th.
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3. The above rule satisfies the first appropriateness definition 8 condition.
4. The above rule ensures that for any event, followed by more than 2f
different node events, there will be number k0, such that this event will
eventually be followed by any kth g-base layer with k > k0.
5. Any g-base layer contains at least n−f eventually strongly seen elements.
Lemma 1. A-base, s-base, s′-base, C(a, b) and C ′(a, b)-base layers are par-
ticular cases of g-base layers.
Proof. Three first g-base layer properties are obvious. The fifth one follows
from our network model property that a-rounds are not bounded (cf. 1.1).
We prove the hardest, the fourth g-base property. All mentioned in lemma
statement base layers have a common feature: at least subsequence of layers
is constructed using n− f different node previous layer events. Let’s denote
this property by P .
Take e as any event followed by at least 2f +1 different node events. Let
R me the maximal base layer followed by any of these events. We state that
any layer L greater than R+ 1 and having P property follows e. Indeed, let
w be any event from L. By P property w follows n− f elements from layer
R + 1. Since n− f + 2f + 1 > n+ f and f is the maximal possible number
of malicious nodes, there’s an honest node events e1, e2 with e1 following e
and not following an R+ 1 layer event, and w following e2 from layer R+ 1.
Since their node is honest, either e1 follows e2 or vice-versa. First case is
impossible, hence e2 follows e1 and w follows e. Thus L follows e.
Let’s take any such layer L following e. By lemma statement base layer
definitions, any higher than L base layer element follows at least one element
from L and thus follows e. Taking k0 as the base layer index corresponding
to L we finish the proof. 
After giving some base layer examples, we can pass to voting layer ones.
3.3. Voting Layer Examples
In this section we restrict ourselves to three families of voting layer exam-
ples. In all cases kth voting layer is built upon kth base layer. We start with
s-voting layer induced by “strongly seen” relation, similar to the one used in
Hashgraph consensus:
Definition 17 (S-voting layer). Given kth base layer events, we construct
kth s-voting layer as follows: node’s event belongs to kth s-voting layer if
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it is node’s earliest event which strongly sees at least n − f events from kth
base layer.
The above definition inductively gives rise to the following voting layer family:
Definition 18 (S(m)-voting layer). Given kth base layer events, we in-
ductively construct kth s(m)-voting layer (m ≥ 2) as follows:
• s(1)-voting layer is equal to s-voting layer from the previous definition
• node’s event belongs to kth s(m)-voting layer if it is node’s earliest event
that strongly sees at least n− f events from kth s(m-1)-voting layer.
Remark 10. The definition of s(m) voting layers implicitly contains round
completion property (cf. definition 4). This slightly differs it from rounds
used in Hashgraph consensus.
Remark 11. Layer similar to s(2)-voting layer is also mentioned in [2] as
an alternative to s-voting layers.
Later we will mostly use the following voting layers:
Definition 19 (S′-voting and S′(m)-voting layers). Replacing “strongly
seeing” by “strongly following” in definitions of s-voting and s(m)-voting lay-
ers we get the definitions of s′-voting and s′(m)-voting layers correspond-
ingly.
Next voting layer example is naturally connected with a-rounds:
Definition 20 (A-voting layer). Given kth base layer events, kth a-voting
layer is constructed as follows: node’s event belongs to kth a-voting layer if
it is node’s earliest event that clearly follows at least n − f events from kth
base layer.
The corresponding voting layer family is:
Definition 21 (A(m)-voting layer). Given kth base layer events, kth a(m)-
voting layer (m ≥ 2) is inductively constructed as follows:
• a(1)-voting layer is equal to a-voting layer from the previous definition
• node’s event belongs to kth a(m)-voting layer if it is node’s earliest event
that clearly follows at least n− f events from kth a(m-1)-voting layer.
Of course, all the above definitions are based just on events and their ances-
tors. This implies the first condition of being “appropriate” from definition
8. In order to show that the second condition is satisfied we need, first, to
provide the fame consensus used.
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3.4. Fame Voting Consensus
Here we will present our modified fame voting consensus. Recall that in
decideFame procedure Hashgraph algorithm uses BFT binary consensuses
similar to that of Bracha and Toueg (cf. proposition 1). These consensus
algorithms have different (though equivalent) decision procedures (cf. end of
proposition 1 proof):
• the former waits until some witness strongly sees more than 2n/3 of
previous round witnesses with the same vote
• that of Bracha and Toueg requires that node decides when its newly
created witness strongly sees (in relaxed sense, definition 5) more than
(n+ f)/2 previous round witnesses with the same vote.
These decision examples raised a question: “Is there a faster, yet equiva-
lent decision procedure for a fame consensus?”. An example of such faster
procedure is given in the next definition.
Definition 22. We call fast decision (or f-decision, for short) the proce-
dure when a node decides if its newly created event (not necessarily witness)
strongly follows more than (n + f)/2 same round witnesses with the same
vote.
Lemma 2. F-decision is faster than and equivalent (decides on the same
value) to decisions in both Hashgraph fame consensus and Bracha-Toueg one.
Proof. Consider some node p. By definition, if Hashgraph fame consensus de-
cides for p, then some witness w (probably created by another node) strongly
sees more than 2n/3 of previous round witnesses with the same vote. Node p
is aware of w, hence node p’s latest event strongly follows all 2n/3 of previous
round witnesses, which are strongly seen by w. Since 2n/3 > (n + f)/2, we
got the conditions for f-decision for p. This implies that f-decision has weaker
requirements than the Hashgraph fame consensus one. Hence it is faster.
The statement that f-decision is faster than Bracha-Toueg one follows di-
rectly from the definition and the fact that “strongly seeing” implies “strongly
following”.
To prove the equivalence of decision procedures, we suppose that f-decision
condition is satisfied: p’s latest event strongly follows a set of more than
(n+ f)/2 given round witnesses (we denote it by Mv) with the same vote v,
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and show that all next round witnesses will have v as a vote (implying that
both Hashgraph and Bracha-Toueg fame consensuses will decide v).
The obvious fact that (n+ f)/2+ (n+ f)/2 = n+ f implies that at most
one node’s witness of the given round can be strongly followed by an event
(even for malicious nodes, trying to fork).
Let wn be any next round witness and S (with |S| ≥ n − f) be the
corresponding set of witnesses strongly seen by it (|.| means the cardinality
of a set). Set S ∩Mv contains at least |Mv|+ |S| − n elements. Since
|Mv|+ |S| − n > n+ f
2
+ |S| − n ≥ n+ f
2
+
n− f
2
+
|S|
2
− n = |S|
2
,
more than a half elements of S has vote v, which implies that wn will vote
v. This finishes the proof. 
With f-decision being defined, we can describe fame consensus procedure
that will be used further.
Definition 23 (F-fame consensus. Consensus layers). Suppose that we
have an element e from some base layer with V being the corresponding voting
layer. We want nodes to collectively decide whether e is famous or not. We
define f-fame consensus similarly to that of Hashgraph and Bracha-Toueg
fame ones as follows:
• by analogy with witnesses and base layers, we say that an element be-
longs to 1-consensus layer if it is node’s earliest element that strongly
follows at least n− f voting layer elements (which we can call also 0-
consensus layer, for convenience).
• inductively, k-consensus layer consists of node’s earliest elements
strongly following at least n− f (k-1)-consensus layer elements
• voting layer elements vote for e by whether they clearly follow it or not
(and not necessarily seeing it !)
• votes are passed to the next consensus layers similarly to Hashgraph
and Bracha-Toueg fame consensuses: by majority rule
• [f-decision] whenever we have f-decision condition satisfied: an event
strongly follows a set of more than (n+f)/2 k-consensus layer elements
(for some k ≥ 0) with the same vote v, we decide v.
The proof that f-fame consensus is well-defined is completely analogous to
that of Hashgraph and Bracha-Toueg.
24
3.5. Second appropriateness condition proof
Given examples of base, voting layers, and having defined f-fame consen-
sus, we can prove the following analogue of Baird’s lemma 5.17 from [2]:
Lemma 3. Let’s choose a kth g-base layer B (definition 16). Then, depend-
ing of the choice of kth voting layer, under f-fame consensus we have:
a. if voting layer is s(m)-voting or s′(m)-voting layer then there will be at
least one famous event in B as soon as 2-consensus layer element is
created.
b. in case of a(m)-voting layer, as soon as 2-consensus layer element is
created, there will be either a famous event in B or a fork (e, e′) ∈ B
will be detected with both e and e′ followed by voting layer events which,
in their turn, are strongly followed by some 1-consensus layer elements.
Proof. Case (a). The proof in this case is very similar to that of lemma
5.17 from [2]. We provide it here for convenience. Suppose that 2-consensus
layer element w is created. Denote by S1 (with |S1| ≥ n − f) the set of
1-consensus events strongly followed by w. Let S0 (with |S0| ≥ n− f) be the
set of voting layer elements strongly followed by at least one element from
S1. Each element in S0 strongly follows at least n − f elements from B.
Since at most one node’s event in the given layer can be strongly followed,
the fact n − f > 2n/3 implies that there’s an element b ∈ B′ ⊆ B that is
strongly followed by more than 2n/3 ∗ |S0|/|B′| ≥ 2|S0|/3 elements from S0
(B′ consists of elements from B strongly followed by any element from S0,
hence |B′| ≤ n). Strongly following implies clear following thus more that
two thirds of elements from S0 votes for b being famous. We denote by Sb
these elements.
Consider any element e from S1. Let Se be all events from S0 strongly
followed by e. Then |Se| > 2n/3 and
|Sb ∩ Se| = |Sb|+ |Se| − |Sb ∪ Se| > 2|S0|/3 + (|Se|/2 + n/3)− |S0| ≥ |Se|/2.
Hence the majority of Se will vote TRUE for b being famous, and thus e will.
This implies that all elements in S1 will vote TRUE and w decides that b is
famous (f-decision condition is satisfied, since n− f > (n+ f)/2).
Case (b). We define w, S1, S0 the same way we did in (a). Here key differ-
ence with (a) is that elements from S0 just clearly follow and not necessarily
strongly follow events from B. Denote by B′ events from B clearly followed
by at least one event from S0. Two cases are possible:
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• There are no forks in B′. This implies that only one given node event
from B′ is clearly followed by events from S0. Hence we can argue the
same way we did in (a) to show the existence of famous event b ∈ B′.
• For some node there’s a fork (e, e′) in B′. By definition of B′ this means
that there are events s, t ∈ S0 such that s clearly follows e and t clearly
follows e′. Since both s and t are strongly followed by some events from
S1, we proved the lemma statement. 
The lemma allows us the prove the desired second “appropriateness” con-
dition of base and voting layer examples given above:
Proposition 2 (Appropriateness, 2nd). For g-base layer and any voting
layer example provided above, under f-fame consensus, we have that if an
event is known to more than 2f nodes then it will be followed by a famous
event from some base layer.
Proof. Let w be an event from the proposition statement. We consider two
cases:
Case one: voting layer is s(m)-voting or s′(m)-voting layer. Then by
fourth g-base layer property (cf. definition 16) there will be g-base layer L,
such that any element in L follows w. By lemma (3a) there’s eventually a
famous element in L, hence it follows w.
Case two: voting layer is a(m)-voting layer. Again, by fourth g-base layer
property, there will be g-base layer L0 following w. By lemma (3b) there’s
either a famous element in L0 or a fork (e, e′) ∈ L0 with both e, e′ followed
by voting layer events which, in their turn, are strongly followed by some 1-
consensus layer elements. The former case brings us the proof. We consider
the second, the fork case.
Since both e and e′ are strongly followed and (n+f)/2 > 2f , we can apply
fourth g-base layer property to them. Take any g-base layer L1 following both
e and e′ (and following w, of course). Let V1 be the voting layer corresponding
to L1. Denote by F malicious node that created e and e′. Since all events in
L1 follow F ’s fork, no event in V1 will clearly follow any events in L1 created
by F (if there are any). De-facto F gets banned from the network. By lemma
(3b) there’s either a famous element in L1 or a fork (this time by different
from F malicious node). And, again, we either get a proof or get second
malicious node. Repeating the above step until we ban all forking malicious
nodes we will eventually find a famous event following w. 
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3.6. BVCFameDecide Procedure Pseudocode
Having proven appropriateness of base, voting layer, fame consensus ex-
amples, we present pseudocode of BVCFameDecide procedure, which can be
considered as a merge of general analogues of divideRounds and decideFame
procedures. fastFindOrder procedure, a fast modification of findOrder one
will be provided in the next subsection. As in Baird’s Hashgraph consensus,
these procedures will be called by node one after another right after every
gossip receipt:
Procedure: General Base-Voting-Consensus atomic broadcast algo-
rithm
run two loops in parallel:
while TRUE do
gossip all known events to a random node
while TRUE do
receive a gossip
create a new event
call BVCFameDecide
call fastFindOrder
Given appropriate in the sense of definition 8 base, voting and consensus
layers, procedure BVCFameDecide consists of their calculation and of fame
decisions based on f-fame consensuses from definition 23. In particular, as
base layer one can take any example from subsection 3.2, as voting layer
one can choose s(m), s′(m) or a(m) voting layers (cf. subsection 3.3), as
consensus layers - the ones from definition 23. We will need the following:
Definition 24 ((Un)decided base layer). As we will see, BVCFameDe-
cide includes f-fame consensuses (cf. definition 23) on whether base layer
elements are famous or not. If some base layer has all their possible elements
(even not created yet) with decided fame, we call such base layer decided.
Otherwise we call it undecided.
27
Now procedure BVCFameDecide can be presented in the following preudocode:
Procedure: BVCFameDecide
/* Event e runs through all newly added/created events during the
last gossip receipt, ordered using follows relation with earliest
going first */
if e should be member of a new base layer then
create new base layer and add e to it
B← set of all undecided base layers, with earliest going first
for base layer B in B do
/* Calculating whether e belongs to a particular base layer */
if e should be a member of B then
add e to B
if e ∈ B was declared unfamous in absentia then
e.famousB ← FALSE // e ∈ B was created “too late”
/* Starting f-fame consensus protocol for elements from B */
K ← maximal non-negative number (if exists) such that
K-consensus layer CK corresponding to B has more than
(n+ f)/2 strongly followed elements
if K exists then
S ← the set of strongly followed elements in CK
v ← the majority vote of elements in S for whether b is famous
Nv ← number of elements in S with vote v
if Nv > (n+ f)/2 then // f-decision condition
b.famousB ← v // deciding fame of b as a member of B
if all possible elements in B have fame decided then
continue loop for the next base layer in B
V ← the voting layer corresponding to B
if e should be a member of V then
add e to V
for event b in B do
e.voteVb∈B ← does e ∈ V clearly follow b ∈ B? // voting
if some possible member x of B is still not created then
e.voteVx∈B ← FALSE // e ∈ V votes against x’s fame in
absentia
if e should be a member of any k-consensus layer C corresponding
to B then // k > 0
add e to C // creating new layer C if necessary
for undecided event b in B do // including not created yet too
Ck−1 ← (k − 1)-consensus layer corresponding to B
S ← the set of elements from Ck−1 strongly followed by e
v ← the majority vote of elements in S for whether b ∈ B is
famous (TRUE for a tie)
e.voteCb∈B ← v // voting in higher layers as element of C
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Remark 12. We should note that we used the notations x ∈ B and b ∈ B in
BVCFameDecide procedure pseudocode to emphasize the fact that they can be
members of several base layers. Votes for such elements and their fame are
collected and decided separately regarding the base layer being considered.
Remark 13. Similarly to the previous remark notation e.voteC∗ means that
e can have different votes as a member of different consensus layers C.
Remark 14. In the above procedure we used several simple facts:
• If an event is just added to hashgraph, it can’t be strongly followed for
n > 1.
• If f-decision condition is satisfied for k-consensus layer, it will be also
satisfied for all consecutive consensus layers as soon as they have enough
number of strongly followed elements.
Remark 15. As one can see, the decision conditions are checked before do-
ing most of calculations for e. This is done for performance reasons.
3.7. Total Order
The goal of this subsection is to present a simple modification of findOrder
procedure with the emphasis on speed and low latency. Informally, by atomic
broadcast algorithm commit latency we mean average time between event
creation and the time when this event is added to the event total order (cf.
section 4 for formal definition).
Remark 16. Further on we will identify words “faster”, “higher speed” with
“lower latency” for convenience.
As we already mentioned in network model description (cf. 1.1), consen-
sus protocol is possible with probabilistic termination only. Recall that, to
achieve this for fame consensuses, Bracha and Toueg assume in [5] fair sched-
uler property, while Bracha in [4] and Baird in [2] add randomization using
coin toss/flip tricks. In this paper we follow Bracha and Toueg for algorithm
definition simplicity, but coin tosses can easily be added if necessary.
Now, when we have fame consensus probabilistic termination we present
our findOrder procedure version as a pseudocode, starting with the following
definitions:
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Definition 25 (Layer processed). Recall from definition 24 that base lay-
ers can be decided or undecided. If we process decided base layer in fastFind-
Order procedure, we set their processed property to TRUE.
Procedure: fastFindOrder
B← set of all decided and not yet processed base layers
Bmin ← the earliest element in B
while there is no unprocessed base layers before Bmin do
if there’s no famous element in Bmin then
/* Skipping this layer, fork was detected */
else
/* Any newly added/created event has ‘commitLayer’ and
‘commitSubLayer’ parameters equal to null */
E ← set of all events with null commitLayer and followed by at
least one famous event from Bmin
subLayer ← 0
while E is not empty do
Emin ← subset of E consisting of events that follow only
events with commitLayer not null
forall e ∈ Emin do
e.commitLayer ← ordinal layer number of Bmin
e.commitSubLayer ← subLayer
e.consensusT imestamp← median of creation
timestamps of all famous events in Bmin
E ← E \ Emin // set subtraction
subLayer ← subLayer + 1
Bmin.processed← TRUE // recording the fact being processed
B← B \ {Bmin}
Bmin ← the earliest element in B if there’s any else break the loop
/* Similarly to [2] event’s whitened signature is its signature
XORed with the signatures of all famous events in event’s commit
layer Bmin */
return all events with defined commitLayer, sorted by commitLayer,
then ties sorted by commitSubLayer, then by whitened signatures
Remark 17. The main difference from Baird’s findOrder procedure is that
we don’t wait until event is followed by all famous layer events. We need
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just one famous event. Of course, consensusTimestamp is no more a differ-
entiator for events with the given commitLayer, but we think this is a good
trade-off for the algorithm speed.
Remark 18. The commitSubLayer assignment trick is similar to Moser and
Melliar-Smith notion of candidate sets in [11].
In order to do the next remark we need the following definition:
Definition 26 (Supported events). We call an event supported if it is
clearly followed by more than (n + f)/2 events created by different nodes.
Remark 19. With enough calculation power a node can do BVCFameDecide
and fastFindOrder procedures right after every event addition to hashgraph,
and not only after gossip receipt during which multiple events usually added.
In order for this to take an effect one can replace “strongly following” by
weaker “being supported” property in f-decision part of f-fame consensus def-
inition 23. This can allow node to faster confirm that certain events were
added to the total order.
Remark 20. Definition 8, consensus probabilistic termination and fastFind-
Order procedure guarantee that, given appropriate base/voting layers and con-
sensus definitions, every event known by more than 2f nodes will be commit-
ted (added to the total order) with probability 1. They also assure that this
order is consistent across the honest nodes. Proposition 2 assures that the
same is true for g-base layers, voting layer examples and f-fame consensus
provided in the previous subsections.
Having defined BVC atomic broadcast family of algorithms and having shown
its richness and appropriateness, we can pass to the next section, concerning
one of the most important features of atomic broadcast algorithms: commit
latency.
4. Algorithm Commit Speed Comparison
In this section we define algorithm commit latency and commit speed
and show that some BVC family members are almost 1.5 times faster than
Hashgraph consensus algorithm.
Suitable atomic broadcast speed metrics choice is a hard problem on
itself. In theory, one has to know network parameters, adversary possibilities
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to control the network and possible message exchange scenario distribution.
There are many comparative studies of atomic broadcast algorithms some of
which can be found, for example, in [12] and [13]. During such comparisons
most widely used metrics are the latency ones, a variant of which called
commit latency we will use in our comparison:
Definition 27 (Commit latency). • Informally, by atomic broadcast
algorithm commit latency we mean average time between event cre-
ation and the time when this event is added to the event total order.
• More formally, let p be a node and Hp its hashgraph representing some
gossip exchange scenario. Then for any algorithm A from BVC fam-
ily (cf. previous section) we define its commit latency on Hp as the
average of differences tAcomm(e) − tAcr(e), where e ∈ Hp runs through
committed by A events (added to the total order by fastFindOrder pro-
cedure), tAcr(e) and tAcomm(e) are event creation and commit times defined
further.
For uniformity reasons we don’t use event creation timestamp as it’s creation
time tAcr(e), which we define it as follows:
Definition 28 (Creation time). For an event e its creation time tAcr(e)
is defined as the length of the longest follows relation path in hashgraph from
event to any node starting event. We assume that hashgraph edges between
event and its self-parent have length 0, while between event and its other
parent have length 1.
Remark 21. De-facto event creation time measures time passed from net-
work start, with assumption that one gossip takes some fixed amount of time
(which we call simply unit time).
Definition 29 (Commit time). Let e be an event in honest node p hash-
graph Hp. Then e’s commit time is defined as creation time of earliest
created by p event e′ whose set of ancestors (which is itself a hashgraph) is
enough for algorithm A to decide that e can be committed.
An obvious weakness of commit time metric is that if there are few or none
events in hashgraph ready to commit then commit time will be inadequate.
But it’s not really a problem since in real applications it makes sense to
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consider long enough gossip scenarios whose corresponding hashgraphs will
be very big and contain lots of committed events.
In definition 27 we defined commit latency for some hashgraph Hp. In
order to make this definition more objective we consider a representative
set of 180 different gossip scenarios: 20 scenarios for each node number
n ∈ {4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 15, 20, 30, 50} of which 10 scenarios contain no faults and
10 contain crash faults whose number is uniformly increasing from 1 up to
f = b(n − 1)/3c. We extend algorithm commit latency definition on the
corresponding set of hashgraphs taking the average of commit latencies on
each of them.
Definition 30 (Commit speed). By BVC algorithm commit speed we
simply mean the inverse of its commit latency. With this definition we can
freely use words “faster”, “slower”, etc.
Now we describe how the exchange scenarios above were constructed.
As the basis we choose computational network model from [6]. It consists
of processes communicating by sending each other messages. A message is
a pair (p,m), where p is the name of the destination process and m is a
“message value” from a fixed universe M . The message system maintains a
multiset, called the message buffer, of messages that have been sent but not
yet delivered. It supports two abstract operations:
• send(p, m): Places (p,m) in the message buffer.
• receive(p): Deletes some message (p,m) from the buffer and returns
m, in which case we say (p,m) is delivered, or returns the special null
marker ∅ and leaves the buffer unchanged.
The message system acts nondeterministically, subject only to the condition
that if receive(p) is performed infinitely many times, then every message
(p,m) in the message buffer is eventually delivered.
We apply the above setting to our model, replacing message (p,m) by
gossip and its destination pair.
Remark 22. One can note that the “eventually delivered” condition above
prohibits any message loss, which is not realistic when the network is the
Internet itself (cf. an interesting study by Bakr and Keidar in [3] showing
that message loss can sometimes raise above 40%). In our case message loss
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will be modeled when node’s earlier gossip will be delayed and stay longer in
message buffer than its more recent gossip. It can happen that the former
gossip will bring no new knowledge to its destination node and hence will be
skipped by it and considered as being lost.
We construct gossip scenarios for n nodes with k crash-faulty nodes as
follows:
• each node has one starting event
• message buffer total operation number is set to 1000 · n
• on each step we randomly choose which message buffer operation to
choose: send or receive, each with probability 0.5
• k faulty nodes are randomly chosen, as well as their crash fault times
• when send is chosen, we randomly choose non-crashed node q and non-
crashed destination node q and place gossip from p to q in the message
buffer
• when receive is chosen, we randomly take any gossip from the message
buffer
Finally, the corresponding hashgraphs being considered are those of the
node with id = 0 after all 1000 ·n message buffer operations being completed.
Remark 23. For more clarity we put the *.csv files of all 180 generated sce-
narios on https: // github. com/ trafim/ gossip_ scenarios . Interested
readers can conduct all calculations on them themselves.
Notation 1 (BVC examples). In order to do the comparison we will use
simple notations for BVC family members given in section 3. Namely, we
denote a BVC algorithm by BVC.〈base layer〉.〈voting layer〉 where:
• 〈base layer〉 is A for a-base layer (definition 9), S for s-base layer
(definition 10), S′ for s′-base layer (definition 13), Ca,b and C′a,b for
base layers C(a, b), C ′(a, b) from definitions 14 and 15 correspondingly.
• 〈voting layer〉 is Am for a(m)-voting layer (definition 21), Sm for s(m)-
voting layer (definition 18) and S′m for s′(m)-voting layer (definition
19).
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Remark 24. We do not include consensus layer in our notation since the
same f-fame consensus is used in all BVC examples considered.
Using the above notation we introduce the following
Notation 2. For algorithm BVC.S.S1, which is the closest to Hashgraph
consensus BVC family member, we will use special BVC.HG notation. Hash-
graph consensus itself will be denoted simply by HG.
Now we are ready to present a list of algorithms, which will be used in our
comparison. They will be:
• HG, BVC.HG, BVC.S′.S′1
• BVC.A.A1, BVC.A.A2, BVC.A.S′1,
• BVC.S′.A1, BVC.S′.S′2,
• BVC.C2,M.A1 (here and later M = 10000), BVC.C2,M.S′1,
• BVC.C′1,M.A1, BVC.C′1,M.S′1, BVC.C′2,M.A1,
• BVC.C′2,M.S′1, BVC.C′3,M.S′1, BVC.C′4,M.S′1, BVC.C′5,M.S′1
We consider the above list of algorithms to be representative enough. We
prefer s′ layers rather than s layers since they make the algorithms to be a
little faster (as we will see). One of the reasons for that is that in s′ case an
event can be a member of several consensus layers and sometimes helps to
make fame decisions earlier. Constant M is taken big enough to measure the
impact of C(a, ∗)- and C ′(a, ∗)-base layers without considering rare divisible
by M layers.
We present commit latency of each of these algorithms in Table 1. We
calculate commit latency on all scenarios and also separately on all 20 sce-
narios for each n ∈ {4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 15, 20, 30, 50}. Table 2 represents compar-
ative commit latencies of these algorithms to that of BVC.C′3,M.S′1, which
is among the fastest chosen algorithms.
We also present commit latency of some of these algorithms in a more con-
venient way on Figure 4. We chose only the most representative algorithms
to not overburden the image.
As one can see Hashgraph consensus is 1.47 times slower than the fastest
BVC.C′3,M.S
′
1. At the same time Hashgraph consensus closest BVC family
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member BVC.HG appears to be fairly faster than it, and is 1.16 times
slower than BVC.C′3,M.S′1.
General conclusions are that s′-voting layer is more efficient than a-, a(2)-
or s′(2)-voting layers. Also that algorithms of type BVC.C′K,M.S′1 are usu-
ally faster. What is the optimal parameter K or how it depends on n and
M is an open question.
Remark 25. Algorithm BVC.A.S′1 is also worth consideration since it is
only 1.04 times slower and at the same time is free from any parameters.
Remark 26. To illustrate differences in commit latency we show on Figure 5
how algorithms HG, BVC.HG and BVC.S′.S′1 commit events for randomly
generated scenario with 3 nodes.
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Figure 4: Commit latency for chosen atomic broadcast algorithms and node numbers.
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n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 n = 10 n = 12 n = 15 n = 20 n = 30 n = 50 Total
HG 12.9 17.5 21.5 25.7 31.0 34.6 39.6 45.6 55.0 31.5
BVC.HG 10.3 14.2 15.7 20.5 23.8 26.8 31.7 36.0 43.9 24.8
BVC.S′.S′1 10.4 14.2 14.1 20.5 23.0 26.3 31.7 35.5 43.9 24.4
BVC.A.A1 10.1 14.8 13.6 25.5 26.6 31.4 39.9 45.7 58.6 29.6
BVC.A.A2 9.5 12.9 13.9 18.9 21.7 24.3 29.1 32.5 40.0 22.5
BVC.A.S′1 9.4 12.9 13.0 18.8 21.1 23.8 29.0 32.5 39.9 22.3
BVC.S.A1 10.8 15.6 14.7 26.3 28.1 33.3 41.5 47.6 60.6 30.9
BVC.S′.A1 10.8 15.6 14.4 26.3 27.9 33.1 41.5 46.9 60.6 30.8
BVC.S′.S′2 14.2 19.9 19.8 28.2 32.1 36.4 43.9 48.8 60.1 33.7
BVC.C2,M.A1 10.4 15.0 13.6 26.7 28.1 33.9 43.5 50.1 65.3 31.9
BVC.C2,M.S
′
1 9.2 12.2 12.0 18.1 19.8 22.9 28.2 31.5 39.7 21.5
BVC.C′1,M.A1 10.5 15.1 14.0 28.2 29.2 35.4 45.1 53.1 68.5 33.2
BVC.C′1,M.S
′
1 9.1 12.1 11.9 18.1 19.9 23.0 28.8 31.7 40.2 21.6
BVC.C′2,M.A1 10.2 14.8 13.5 26.5 27.7 33.2 42.8 49.2 64.0 31.3
BVC.C′2,M.S
′
1 9.2 12.3 12.1 18.1 19.8 23.0 28.1 31.0 39.2 21.4
BVC.C′3,M.S
′
1 9.5 12.6 12.2 18.2 20.0 22.9 27.9 30.9 38.7 21.4
BVC.C′4,M.S
′
1 9.5 12.9 12.5 18.2 20.1 22.8 28.0 31.1 38.8 21.5
BVC.C′5,M.S
′
1 9.5 12.9 13.0 18.4 20.3 22.9 28.1 31.1 38.8 21.7
Table 1: Commit latency for chosen atomic broadcast algorithms and node numbers.
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n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 n = 10 n = 12 n = 15 n = 20 n = 30 n = 50 Total
HG 1.35 1.38 1.75 1.41 1.55 1.51 1.42 1.47 1.42 1.47
BVC.HG 1.08 1.13 1.29 1.13 1.19 1.17 1.14 1.16 1.13 1.16
BVC.S′.S′1 1.09 1.13 1.15 1.13 1.15 1.15 1.14 1.15 1.13 1.14
BVC.A.A1 1.06 1.17 1.11 1.4 1.33 1.37 1.43 1.48 1.52 1.38
BVC.A.A2 0.99 1.02 1.14 1.04 1.08 1.06 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.05
BVC.A.S′1 0.99 1.02 1.06 1.03 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.03 1.04
BVC.S.A1 1.13 1.24 1.2 1.45 1.4 1.45 1.49 1.54 1.57 1.44
BVC.S′.A1 1.13 1.24 1.17 1.45 1.4 1.44 1.49 1.52 1.57 1.44
BVC.S′.S′2 1.49 1.58 1.62 1.55 1.61 1.59 1.57 1.58 1.55 1.57
BVC.C2,M.A1 1.09 1.19 1.11 1.47 1.41 1.48 1.56 1.62 1.69 1.49
BVC.C2,M.S
′
1 0.96 0.97 0.98 1.0 0.99 1.0 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.0
BVC.C′1,M.A1 1.1 1.2 1.14 1.55 1.46 1.54 1.62 1.72 1.77 1.55
BVC.C′1,M.S
′
1 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.99 1.0 1.0 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.01
BVC.C′2,M.A1 1.07 1.17 1.1 1.46 1.39 1.45 1.53 1.59 1.65 1.46
BVC.C′2,M.S
′
1 0.96 0.98 0.99 1.0 0.99 1.0 1.01 1.0 1.01 1.0
BVC.C′3,M.S
′
1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
BVC.C′4,M.S
′
1 1.0 1.02 1.02 1.0 1.0 0.99 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
BVC.C′5,M.S
′
1 1.0 1.02 1.06 1.01 1.01 1.0 1.01 1.0 1.0 1.01
Table 2: Comparative commit latency for chosen atomic broadcast algorithms and node
numbers. 39
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: Figures (5a), (5b) and (5c) represent witnesses (base layer elements) and com-
mitted events by algorithms HG, BVC.HG and BVC.S′.S′1 correspondingly. Here we
use the color notation similar to that of Hashgraph consensus examples [1]: light orange
are witnesses with undecided fame; light green - famous witnesses, light gray - other events;
darker colors mean that an event was committed; last event is marked with purple color
for convenience. One can see that with the same knowledge BVC.HG commits more
events than HG, and BVC.S′.S′1 even more than BVC.HG.
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5. Practical Use Cases, Remarks, Future Work and Acknowledge-
ment
5.1. Applications
As atomic broadcast algorithms BVC Family can be used in all corre-
sponding domains. Examples are distributed databases and file storages,
synchronization services, cryptocurrency and blockchain domains.
5.2. Proof-of-Stake
A special but important case mentioned in [2] in the proof-of-stake one.
We briefly remind it. The idea is that in Hashgraph consensus when node
made some action, it added “+1” to certain statistics, be it fame voting,
decision making, forking, etc. It is not hard to check that if instead node
will add not “+1” but some positive integer associated with them, known as
their “stake”, all the proofs in Hashgraph consensus still hold. This is due
to the fact that Hashgraph consensus depends on properties like “more than
2n/3 of the members” and “at least half of events”, etc.
Stakes allow to make some nodes more important than the others and
also introduce economic incentives to keep the network alive. Straightfor-
ward examples are: reward nodes increasing their stake for creating famous
witnesses and punish them for forking decreasing it.
Remark 27. The above proof-of-stake case can also be extended to BVC
Family since its members are based on similar to Hashgraph consensus statis-
tics. The only change that should be made is to replace f = b(n − 1)/3c by
n/3 since stakes are not integer numbers anymore.
5.3. Crash Recovery Models
Another interesting case is ZooKeeper’s atomic broadcast protocol [9]
system model. It admits that instead of any malicious behavior nodes can
just crash and recover indefinitely many times. One can show that all BVC
Family algorithms can be applied to this case even when we increase possible
number of faulty nodes f from b(n − 1)/3c to b(n − 1)/2c. Proof-of-Stake
case is also valid if we change f < n/3 to f < n/2.
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5.4. Future Work
Despite the fact that we presented some quite fast examples of atomic
broadcast algorithms, which can be readily used in practice, the work in not
finished yet. As the future research direction we consider choosing the most
promising network probability models and finding the fastest algorithms in
BVC Family according to them.
5.5. Acknowledgement
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A. Variant of Gossip Protocol
Recall that in gossip protocol definition (cf. subsection 1.2) node sends
to another node “all of the information it knows so far”. Of course knowledge
exchange should be optimized since node’s knowledge grows linearly with
time. In [1] Baird proposes the following gossip protocol simple optimization:
• before gossip receipt from node i, node j sends to i an array of how
many events j knows about that were created by each node.
• node i compares this array with its array and sends to j only events i
knows about but j doesn’t. For example if i knows 7 events created by
some node p and j knows 5 events by p then i will send j only two last
events created by p.
This approach works until some node p starts to fork. In this case p’s events
and self-parent relation form a tree and not a sequence anymore. Hence
during a gossip just sending the number of known events created by p is not
enough for knowledge exchange. In this appendix we present an extension
of Baird’s optimization that allows honest nodes to efficiently share their
knowledge about events, “follows” relation and forks.
First, we should mention that malformed events (the ones with two self-
parents, wrong transactions, etc.) are filtered out by honest nodes immedi-
ately: an honest node just checks each event it receives during gossip using
any prescribed event creation rules. If this check fails faulty node, which
created this event, is put in the honest node ban list and no gossips from it
are ever admitted. For convenience we introduce the following definitions:
Definition 31 (Event Index). Let i be some node that didn’t fork. Then
for an event e created by i we can define it’s index as e’s ordinary index in
created by i event sequence (with starting event having index 0). We denote
this index by idxe.
Definition 32 (Last Index Array). We call the array of all non-forking
node last event indices known to node i as i’s last index array and denote
it by liai.
Definition 33 (Digest). For an event e created by node p we call its digest
triplet (h(e), idp, idxe) where h(e) is hash of e, idp is a numeric identifier of
p and idxe is index of e.
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Remark 28. In order to exclude certain ambiguities we suppose that each
event contains not just the hashes of its parents but their digests.
Now we start to describe our variant of gossip protocol. We consider any
two nodes i and j. Suppose node j wants to receive all events node i knows
about. We describe four cases depending on whether these nodes are aware
about any forks or not. We cover first case in details and briefly the other
cases.
A.1. Case 1: Both i and j are not aware of any forks
Node j starts by sending liaj to node i. After getting it from j, i compares
this array with liai and sends to j only events whose indices are greater than
the last index in liaj of their corresponding creator. On receipt of these
new events from i, j sorts them (with earliest going first) using the “follows”
relation (by looking at parent digests they contain). Then j adds these events
one-by-one to its hashgraph checking each time whether new event e to be
added is not malformed . Node j also each time verifies two facts for e:
• Self-parent digest contained in e should coincide with the digest of event
from j’s hashgraph created by the same node and having smaller by
1 index than that of e. Of course the latter event should exist in j’s
hashgraph.
• Other parent digest in e should coincide with event already present in
j’s hashgraph.
If these checks are passed then communication is considered to be success-
fully finished. As one can see in this case the protocol is exactly Baird’s
optimization described at the beginning of the appendix.
If i has sent j its known events according to the protocol (otherwise j
would cancel gossip receipt) then in case the above facts are not true for one
or several events, node j has two possibilities for any such event e created by
some node p:
• [Self-parent problem] Event e contains self-parent digest (h, idp, idxe−
1) and j’s hashgraph has event e′ with digest (h(e′) 6= h, idp, idxe − 1).
Since both e, e′ are created by the same node p we have that either e is
malformed or p created a fork (e, e′). In both cases j has a proof that p
is malicious since all events in a fork are signed by their cheating creator
p. Using this proof j can issue any kind of punishing p transaction.
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• [Other parent problem] Event e contains other parent digest (h, idp′ , idx),
where p 6= p′ and j knows about event e′ with digest (h′ 6= h, idp′ , idxe′ =
idx). Here j suspects p′ in creating a fork or p in creating malformed
event e and i sending j this malformed event nevertheless.
In both cases j will not consider communication finished and it will send to
i a special case of so-called “compressed fork information”, which we define
in general as follows:
Definition 34. Let pf be a faulty node who created one or several forks.
Then events created by pf and “follows” relation form not a sequence but
a tree. Any honest node ph knows whole or a part of this tree. Node ph
represents its knowledge about pf ’s event tree as an array of tuples of hashes
(h(s0), h(t0)), . . . , (h(sm), h(tm)) where t0, . . . , tm are branch tips of pf ’s tree
known to ph and si represent the latest supported event created by pf and
followed by ti in ph’s hashgraph.
• We call this array of tuples ph’s compressed fork information about
pf ’s event tree. We denote it cfipf .
• For any tuple (h(s), h(t)) from above we define as corresponding tree
branch the chain of events s, . . . , t where each event is the self-parent
of the next one.
Remark 29. cfip can be considered as p’s event number replacement for
malicious p during gossip exchange between nodes.
Remark 30 (Supported). We remind from definition 26 that an event is
supported if it is clearly followed by more than (n + f)/2 events created
by different nodes. We use such events because of their nice property that
supported events created by the same node (even malicious one) can never
form a fork.
Remark 31. Compressed fork information can be transferred in an even
more compact form when tuples with common si are joined together in an
array-hash tuple. We provide an example of this on Figure 7.
Now we return to our situation when node j just detected one or several
forks or suspects a fork or malformed event creation. Since both i and j
were not aware of any forks before this communication, to get all events still
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unknown to j it suffices for j to send i only one tuple (h(s), h(t)) for every
cheating node p (here t is the last p’s event known to j and s it’s latest
supported ancestor). Note that these tuples represent a particular case of
compressed fork information received by i. We know that supported events
form a sequence even for a forking node. This fact allows i to derive which
events j is still missing and send them to it. In its turn j figures out that
either i was cheating and create punishing i transaction or get a proof of
fork. In this case, again, using this proof j can issue any kind of punishing
forking node transaction.
An example illustrating second part of this case is given on Figure 6.
A.2. Cases 2 and 3: Node j knows about some forks, i either knows
or doesn’t know about any forks
In this case j starts by sending to i liaj and all cfip where p runs through
all forking nodes known to j. Note that j puts in liaj indices of latest
supported events created by forking nodes.
In its turn, node i acts almost as in the first case comparing liai with
liaj and sending to j not only events with big enough indices but also tree
branches corresponding to i’s compressed fork information tuples that are
absent among the ones it got from j.
After getting this events node j as in first case collects all invalid pairs
of events e, e′ where e contains a digest (h, idp, ind) and e′ has a digest (h′ 6=
h, idp, ind) for some node p. If there are no such pairs communication is
successfully finished.
Otherwise, to get all missing events it suffices for j to send i all compressed
fork information about such suspicious nodes p. Node i in its turn sends to
j all missing tree branches and communication is considered as successfully
finished. We illustrate a fork information exchange by example on Figure 7.
A.3. Case 4: Node j is not aware of any forks but i does
Here j starts by sending liaj to i and afterwards i and j act as in the
previous cases 2 and 3.
A.4. Remarks
One can see that when there are any known forks in the system, nodes
start to exchange their compressed fork information. If no new forks appear
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6: Case 1 of gossip protocol variant. (6a), (6b) represent hashgraphs of nodes
i = p1, j = p3 correspondingly. (6c) represents all events. j is about to create event x
(marked by purple) on receipt of a message from i. Node i compares its last index array
(4, 4, 6,−) with j’s array (−, 1, 6, 3) and sends to j events e0, e1 among others. Node j
sees that digests (h0, idp, 4) in e0 and (h1, idp, 6) in e1 contain different hashes from those
of events c0 and c2 correspondingly. This gives j the idea that either p or i is cheating.
Thus j sends its compressed fork information (h(a0), h(c2)) to i expecting i to send its
part of p’s fork. In case i is honest it will send chain of events a1, a2, b0, b1, b2 to j and j
will get all p’s events known by i and proof that p forked. In case i is faulty node j will
have a proof of protocol violation by i since all i’s messages are signed by i.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7: Example of faulty node p event tree structure exchange in cases 2, 3. Fig-
ures (7a), (7b) represent nodes i and j knowledge about p’s event tree correspondingly.
(7c) is the whole p’s event tree. By green color we mark supported events in the cor-
responding hashgraphs. By our protocol j sends index of a2 in liaj and compressed
fork information cfip, which is (h(a2), h(b0)), (h(a2), h(t3)), (h(a2), h(t4)), (h(a2), h(t5)) to
i. As it was mentioned in remark 31 this compressed fork information can be reduced to
(h(a2), [h(b0), h(t3), h(t4), h(t5)]). On receipt i compares liaj and j’s cfip with i’s knowl-
edge about p’s event tree and sends back events t0, a2, b0, b1, t1, b2, t2, which constitute
missing by j tree branches. In such a way j knows all p’s events node i is aware of.
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then there is no need to resend already sent cfi. To achieve this each node
can store fork information it sent to each other node and evade resending the
same information to the same node again.
One can also include in cfi not only branch tip hashes but also their graph
distances from the root events in forking node event tree. These distances
coincide with event index in case when tree is a sequence. Such additional
information allows to save bandwidth in cases when one node knows a little
bit more about certain tree branches than the other one.
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